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THE BROWNING OF THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE:




Marielena Gonzdlez 1 was recruited from her hometown in Mex-
ico to work in a large poultry processing plant in northwest Arkansas.
She works alongside hundreds of Latinos on a line that produces
breaded chicken pieces. Her work is difficult, dirty, low-paying and
dangerous. It was not quite the job she expected when she first took
it. The labor contractor who recruited Marielena, her family, and
some of her co-workers in Mexico showed them a videotape of an air-
conditioned plant with people in clean white coats, lined along a con-
veyor belt performing different sets of tasks on the chickens loaded
onto the belt. Marielena recalls that the line depicted in the video was
not moving nearly as fast as the line actually runs at the processing
plant. She also recalls that the videotape showed a much cleaner,
safer, more desirable job than the one she and her colleagues were
hired into. Marielena was concerned that her working, pay, and safety
conditions were getting worse over time. The company continued to
demand more and more production from the workers with no in-
crease in pay. Many of the supervisors were Anglo, but there were
almost no Anglos on the processing lines. Marielena discovered that
her job pays less and the line moves much faster now than it had in
the past. It was her impression that the ethnic makeup of the
workforce had been much more mixed in the past than it now is. En-
* Associate Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of
Nevada, Las Vegas; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1996. I thank Dean Richard Morgan
and the faculty at the William S. Boyd School of Law for their support. I am indebted
to Annette Appell, Joan Howarth, Steve Johnson, Sylvia Lazos Vargas, Ann C.
McGinley, and Jean Sternlight for their insight and comments on earlier drafts of this
Article. This Article was funded by the James E. Rogers Research Fund. Collin
Webster and David Stoft provided excellent research assistance.
1 The name is a pseudonym; Marielena's account represents the stories of sev-
eral workers I interviewed in northwest Arkansas in 2000-2001.
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tire production lines and jobs at the plant are now dominated by
Latinos.
2
Marielena Gonzilez is what social scientists call a "brown collar"
worker. A brown collar worker is a recent Latino immigrant (arriving
in the United States within the past five years) who works in an occu-
pation in which Latinos are concentrated or overrepresented. 3 Brown
collar workers can be found in fields such as service, manufacturing,
construction, food processing and agriculture-related work. When an
occupation becomes overrepresented by these low-tier workers, condi-
tions worsen for all workers in the occupation. The emergence of
brown collar workers and their impact on wages and conditions in the
workplace has implications not just for these workers themselves, but
for the American workplace. As these workers populate more and
more fields, the workplace risks the re-emergence of segregated
workforces.
This Article explores the concept of the brown collar phenome-
non and some of the issues it presents in employment law, specifically
with respect to disparate treatment theory. It provides a preliminary
analysis of the impact on antidiscrimination law posed by the "brown-
ing" of large sectors of the U.S. labor force. In Part I of this Article, I
introduce social-science data on the existence and growth of brown
collar occupations, that is, occupations in which recent immigrant La-
tinos are overrepresented or concentrated. I use the poultry industry
as a case study, or lens, through which we can examine the phenome-
non. In Part II of this Article, I describe longitudinal and comparative
studies that explore the effects of the brown collarization of certain
occupations on wages and conditions in the workplace. The studies
focus attention on brown collar workers, a particularly vulnerable part
of a minority population. The findings show positive correlations be-
tween the numbers of recent immigrant Latinos in brown collar occu-
pations and wage suppression, worsening conditions and segregation.
The data shows that wage suppression occurs over time as the brown
collar population increases. In Part III, I provide a profile of brown
collar workers, the characteristics that make them particularly vulnera-
ble in the workplace, and their importance to broader efforts to pro-
tect the rights of all workers. Brown collar workers are some of the
most vulnerable workers in the American workplace because of their
2 For similar accounts of Marielena's story, see Lourdes Gouveia & Donald D.
Stull, Dances with Cows: Beefpacking's Impact on Garden City, Kansas, and Lexington, Ne-
braska, in ANY WAY You CUT IT: MEAT PROCESSING AND SMALL-TOWN AMERICA 85 (Don-
ald D. Stull et al. eds., 1995).
3 Lisa Catanzarite, Dynamics of Segregation and Earnings in Brown-Collar Occupa-
tions, 29 WORK AND OCCUPATIONS 300, 301 (2002).
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recent immigration status, their rural or isolated origins, and their
limited English proficiency. They also face a legal barrier in the Su-
preme Court's recent decision in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., v.
NLRB4 that other workers may not face. Yet, because they are part of
an ever-growing minority and because workers face difficulty changing
workplace conditions without the involvement of this population, it
remains vital to the vindication of rights in the American workplace to
ensure that existing laws effectively protect brown collar workers. In
Part IV of the Article, I suggest legal strategies for protecting brown
collar workers through immigration and employment discrimination
law. First, I suggest that federal administrative agencies cooperate to
provide workers who help in investigations of workplace violations
with U visas and employment authorization documents. This will give
a large segment of brown collar workers the security they need to
come forward with complaints. Second, I review disparate treatment
theory in employment discrimination law and identify two areas where
longitudinal data can help plaintiffs with their proof in a discrimina-
tion case. I suggest that brown collar plaintiffs use longitudinal data
in place of comparator data in situations where the brown collar
workforce in an occupation has reached close to a 100% Latino popu-
lation rate. If the trend continues, this will soon become the case in
some poultry plants, and is certainly already the case on some poultry
lines within plants. I also suggest that the longitudinal data be used to
rebut an employer's argument that it is merely responding to market
forces in hiring brown collar workers into certain occupations. This
data can help the plaintiff show a causal connection between the
browning of an occupation and wage suppression and worsening con-
ditions. I conclude by providing suggestions for further research and
development of theories that will more effectively protect brown col-
lar workers.
I. THE BROWNING PHENOMENON: POULTRY AS A MICROCOSM
Marielena Gonzdilez's description of her work situation is re-
flected in ethnographic studies of brown collar workers' conditions in
the poultry industry.5 Over the past two decades, the poultry industry
has been completely restructured, resulting in a much greater de-
mand for low-wage labor.6 The changes in the industry include the
4 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
5 See Steve Striffler, Inside a Poultry Processing Plant: An Ethnographic Portrait, 43
LAB. HIST. 305, 306-07 (2002).
6 A similar phenomenon has occurred in the meatpacking industry, another in-
dustry that has experienced an influx of brown collar workers. See JAMES M. MACDON-
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increased demand for chicken both at home and abroad, increased
domestic consumer demand for further processed poultry products
(like cut-up chickens, chicken nuggets, and fast food chicken prod-
ucts), and a consolidation in the poultry industry-including vertical
integration-that radically strengthened the market penetration of
the top four poultry firms. 7 Industry consolidation has also resulted
in larger poultry plants, which by the 1990s accounted for almost
three quarters of the poultry produced in the country.8 Moreover, the
industry now requires less formal skill and training for its jobs, and
seeks a workforce willing to do more repetitive and labor intensive
tasks. This industry change, and the concomitant change in
workforce composition over the past decade, illustrates the issues that
arise in increasingly brown collar occupations in several industries.9
The changes wrought by "further processing" in the poultry in-
dustry, along with pressures to heighten productivity, increase the
safety risks imposed on workers. For example, companies may assign
fewer workers to perform the same level of production as in the past.
So, where three workers were at one time assigned to a task, two are
now assigned to complete the same task, which, combined with in-
creased line speed, leads to more workplace injuries.i0 The restruc-
ALD ET AL., CONSOLIDATION IN U.S. MEATPACKING 37-39 (USDA, AGRIC. ECON. REP.
No. 785, 1999), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aer785/aer785.pdf
(last visited Oct. 5, 2004).
7 See William Kandel & Emilio A. Parrado, Industrial Transformation and Hispanic
Migration to the American South: The Case of the Poultry Industry, in HISPANIC SPACES, LA-
TINO PLACES: A GEOGRAPHY OF REGIONAL AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY (Daniel D. Arreola
ed., forthcoming 2004). As of 2002, the top four companies controlled 50% of the
poultry market, 59% of the pork market, and 81% of the beef market. Tyson and
ConAgra were among the top four in each of these markets. See DONALD D. STULL &
MICHAEL J. BROADWAY, SLAUGHTERHOUSE BLUES: THE MEAT AND POULTRY INDUSTRY IN
NORTH AMERICA 158 (Lin Marshall et al. eds., 2004). For a description of similar
consolidation effects in the meatpacking industry, see MACDONALD ET AL., supra note
6; Rochelle L. Dalla et al., Economic Strain and Community Concerns in Three Meatpacking
Communities, 17 RURAL AM. 20 (2002), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publica-
tions/ruralamerica/ral71/ral71c.pdf.
8 Kandel & Parrado, supra note 7, at 9.
9 See MACDONALD ET AL., supra note 6; see also LOURDES GOUVEIA & DONALD D.
STULL, LATINO IMMIGRANTS, MEATPACKING, AND RURAL COMMUNITIES: A CASE STUDY OF
LEXINGTON, NEBRASKA (Mich. St. Univ., Julian Samora Research Rep. No. 26, 1997)
(examining the changes expected to result from the opening of a meatpacking plant
in a Nebraska town and the arrival of Latinos).
10 Striffler, supra note 5, at 308. Safety issues are even more prevalent in the
meatpacking industry. See Note, Challenging Concentration of Control in the American
Meat Industry, 117 HARv. L. REV. 2643, 2654 (2004), for a description of safety con-
cerns in the meatpacking industry, including accidents and repetitive stress injuries
caused by fast moving lines.
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turing in the industry, in other words, is reflected in workers taking on
more work for the same or less pay than their predecessors.
Various factors contribute to the low-wage character of poultry
processingjobs. These factors include the dangerous and undesirable
character of the jobs and the extended economic growth throughout
the eighties and nineties that created a disincentive in the traditional
workforce to take relatively low paying poultryjobs.'1 Normally, these
factors would create a premium for employees, which would require
employers to pay higher wages. That has not been the case here, as
employers have gone outside the local market to places like Mexico
and Central America for workers. 12 Marielena's story is indicative of
the labor recruitment for these jobs; the labor pool has become inter-
national. As a result of such recruiting practices, a geographic region
that previously had low numbers of Latinos has been able to increase
its workforce significantly. -13 A review of the top eighty-six poultry pro-
ducing counties in the country and the top seventy-one rapid growth
Latino counties reveals an overlap of twenty-six counties.' 4 We can
infer from this statistic that poultry production is responsible for a
Latino population boom in one-out-of-three to one-out-of-four of the
top growing Latino counties.
Although the workforce is not monolithic, the trend towards
brown-collarization is distinct and severe. The poultry example is
stark. Over the past two decades, the Latino workforce population in
poultry has increased from 1% to 17%.15 Although the transforma-
tion is remarkable, it still does not reflect the even more phenomenal
changes in some plants and corresponding counties throughout the
Southeast. 16 For example, Benton County, Arkansas, which hosts a
11 Kandel & Parrado, supra note 7, at 11.
12 There is a body of social science literature discussing the historical links be-
tween Mexican migration and the poultry industry. See DAVID GRIFFITH, JONES'S MINI-
MAL: LOW-WAGE LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES (1993); Greig Guthey, Mexican Places in
Southern Spaces: Globalization, Work, and Daily Life in and around the North Georgia Poultry
Industry, in LATINO WORKERS IN THE CONTEMPORARY SOUTH 57-67, (Arthur D. Murphy
et al. eds., 2001); ANY WAY You CUT IT: MEAT PROCESSING AND SMALL TOWN AMERICA
(Donald D. Stull et. al. eds., 1995); see also Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, "Latina/o-ization "of
the Midwest: Cambio de Colores (Change of Colors) As Agromaquilas Expand Into the
Heartland, 13 BERKELEY LA RAzA L.J. 343 (2002) (reporting on recruiting practices in
Missouri).
13 Kandel & Parrado, supra note 7, at 12; see Lazos Vargas, supra note 12, at 366
tbl. 1.
14 Kandel & Parrado, supra note 7, at 12.
15 Id. at 13-14.
16 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS 2000 EEO DATA TOOL [hereinafter CENSUS
2000], at http://www.census.gov/eeo2000/index.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2004).
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chicken processing plant, has a 72.5% Latino poultry/meatpacking
worker rate. 17 The Latino population in the county totals approxi-
mately 9%.18 In Hall County, Georgia, where ConAgra Foods has a
poultry plant, the Latino poultry worker rate is 84%.19 The Latino
population in the county is approximately 20%.2o In Duplin County,
North Carolina, the poultry processing labor force breaks down into
17.5% white, 53.8% Latino, and 27.5% black.21 In one Duplin County
poultry processing plant, the Latino labor force reaches 65% of the
total workforce.
22
This pattern is repeated in other areas of the country and in
other industries. 23 For example, McDonald County, Missouri, which
hosts Simmons and Hudson Foods plants, experienced a 2107%
growth in the Latino population between 1990 and 2000.24 Moniteau
County, Missouri, which hosts a Cargill food processing plant, exper-
ienced an 846% growth in Latino population.
25
Changes in the poultry workforce and in geographic settlement
patterns of Latinos parallel changes in the industry over the past dec-
ade. This is especially true in nonmetropolitan counties in tradition-
ally poultry-producing southeastern states, including Alabama,
Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ten-
nessee, and Virginia, and in midwestern states like Iowa, Nebraska,
and Missouri. 26 These states produce over two-thirds of the nation's
chicken products. 27 The growth of the Latino nonmetropolitan popu-
The Census 2000 EEO Data Tool contains race and ethnicity breakdowns for listed
occupations. For this Article, I conducted a search of the occupation category,
"Butchers and Other Meat, Poultry, and Fish Processing Workers," in counties in Ar-
kansas, Georgia, and North Carolina. The search includes employment by census
occupation codes, residence, county sets, and race/ethnicity categories.
17 Id.
18 U.S. CENSUS BuREAu, ARKANsAS QuIcKFAcTs: BENTON CouNTY, at http://
quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/05/05007.html (last revised July 9, 2004).
19 CENSUS 2000, supra note 16.
20 U.S. CENSUS BuREAu, GEORGIA QUICKFACTS: HALL COUNTY, at http://
quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/13/13139.html (last revised July 9, 2004).
21 CENSUS 2000, supra note 16.
22 Kandel & Parrado, supra note 7, at 20.
23 See also Lazos Vargas, supra note 12, at 366-67 tbls. 1-3. See generally Gouveia &
Stull, supra note 2 (detailing the rapid growth in the Latino/a population throughout
the Midwest);
24 Lazos Vargas, supra note 12, at 367, tbl. 2.
25 Id.
26 Gouveia & Stull, supra note 2, at 89; Kandel & Parrado, supra note 7, at 2;
Lazos Vargas, supra note 12, at 346-47.
27 Gouveia & Stull, supra note 2, at 85; Kandel & Parrado, supra note 7, at 10.
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lation in those states is among the highest in the nation. 28 The pat-
tern of growth is concentrated: over one-third of the rural Latino
population lived in just 109 of the country's 2288 nonmetropolitan
counties. 29 Research indicates that the employer pull figures promi-
nently among the reasons for both the Latino population growth in
nonmetropolitan areas and the concentration in certain counties:
[I]mmigrants are also moving to nontraditional areas because of
recruiting efforts by employers to sustain the number of workers
needed for production in industries with less-than-desirable jobs.
Consequently, the proportion of Hispanics in industries with low
wages and harsh working conditions-meat processing, carpet man-
ufacturing, oil refining, and forestry, to name a few-has increased
dramatically in the past decade.
30
The United States v. Tyson Foods, Inc. case, 3 1 in which executives
allegedly paid labor contractors for access to labor, illustrates the links
between brown collar workers' settlement patterns and employer re-
cruitment practices. In that case, the U.S. government alleged that
Tyson officials paid "coyotes," or labor contractors to recruit an ongo-
ing stream of undocumented workers for its plants in Arkansas, Indi-
ana, Missouri, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.32 The
indictment itself contains details about employer recruiting practices,
such as paying $200 per worker delivered to a plant.3 3 Although no
executive was convicted under the indictment, the general recruiting
practices have been documented elsewhere. A New York Times article
summed up the practice:
Industry experts said it has long been believed that American food
companies recruit in Mexico and knowingly hire illegal workers.
Some said the companies advertise on the radio in Mexico, dis-
28 Kandel & Parrado, supra note 7, at 3.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 4; see also WAYNE A. CORNELIUS & PHILIP L. MARTIN, THE UNCERTAIN CON-
NECTION: FREE TRADE AND MEXICO-U.S. MIGRATION (1993) (arguing that immigration
will decrease as these jobs move to Mexico); ALEJANDRO PoRTEs & RUBEN B. RUMBAUT,
IMMIGRANT AMERICA: A PORTRAIT 17-20 (1990) (noting that immigration is a two-way
process driven by the changing needs immigrants and those who profit from immi-
grant labor).
31 The indictment is available online. See Indictment, United States v. Tyson
Foods, Inc., (E.D. Tenn.) (No. 4:01-CR-061) (Dec. 11, 2001) [hereinafter Tyson In-
dictment], available at http://www.tned.uscourts.gov/cases/401crO61/tyson.PDF.
32 Id. at 9.
33 Id. at 26.
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tribute leaflets, show videos and hire immigrant smugglers, or
"coyotes." 34
In part because of the employer pull, and in part because of the
ever-growing Latino population, the number and variety of brown col-
lar occupations will continue to increase. It is important to under-
stand the impact of brown collarization on the evolving workplace.
II. WAGE AND OTHER IMPACTS IN BROWN COLLAR OCCUPATIONS
As Marielena described, and sociologist Lisa Catanzarite demon-
strates in her recent studies of brown collar workers, the browning of
an occupation tends to correlate with wage depression, segregation
and worsening conditions in a workplace. 35 Dr. Catanzarite is one of a
few researchers who correlated wages with brown collar job composi-
tion over time to determine whether any positive correlation exists. 36
She has conducted groundbreaking work on the subject of brown col-
lar workers and the impact of their presence on wages and working
conditions. One important aspect of Dr. Catanzarite's work is that she
has compared wage data both longitudinally and in contemporaneous
comparisons of workers in various occupations. Her longitudinal
work, along with the contemporaneous studies, provide a more com-
prehensive view of the dynamics of wage setting in brown collar occu-
pations. In her longitudinal studies, Dr. Catanzarite conducted
analyses of job and occupation categories over several occupations
and over decades. 37 She found that occupations with strong over-
34 David Barboza, Meatpackers' Profits Hinge on Pool of Immigrant Labor, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 21, 2001, at A26, available at 2001 WL 32006540.
35 Dr. Catanzarite has studied the brown collar phenomenon and has produced
several reports on the relationship between brown collarization, wages and job con-
centration. See Catanzarite, supra note 3; Lisa Catanzarite, Occupational Context and
Wage Competition of New Immigrant Latinos with Minorities and Whites, in REVIEW OF
BLACK POLITICAL ECONOMY (forthcoming 2004) [hereinafter Catanzarite, Occupational
Context]; Lisa Catanzarite, Wage Penalties in Brown-Collar Occupations, LATINO POLICY &
ISSUES BRIEF no. 8 (UCLA Chicano Studies Research Ctr., Los Angeles, Cal.), Sept.
2003 [hereinafter Catanzarite, Wage Penalties]; Lisa Catanzarite & Michael Bernab6
Aguilera, Working with Co-Ethnics: Earnings Penalties for Latino Immigrants at Latino Job-
sites, 49 Soc. PROBS. 101 (2002); see also Lisa Catanzarite, Race-Gender Composition and
Occupational Pay Degradation, 50 Soc. PROBS. 14 (2003) [hereinafter Catanzarite, Race-
Gender Composition] (suggesting that composition-related wage degradation is due to
the greater vulnerability of occupations where subordinate groups are
overrepresented).
36 While other researchers have conducted studies on the effects ofjob composi-
tion on wages, few have conducted studies with data over time in order to track the
causal link between the two. See Catanzarite, supra note 3.
37 Id. at 301.
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representations of minorities, including Latinos, experience a sub-
stantial wage penalty over time.38 A wage penalty is defined as a
relative pay loss, such as that which occurs when average wages fail to
keep up with those in similar fields, or as a loss relative to comparable
workers.
39
Dr. Catanzarite has conducted other studies that confirm the re-
sults of her work using longitudinal data. Whereas much of the re-
search on the wage effects of immigrant labor compares aggregate
wages across metropolitan areas, Dr. Catanzarite's research focuses on
occupations within local markets. This methodology better approxi-
mates wage setting by employers in certain occupations.40 In her most
recent study, Dr. Catanzarite conducted a comprehensive analysis of
occupations in thirty-eight immigrant receiving metropolitan areas.
41
Her analysis compared wages for whites with those for minorities by
occupation in each of the metropolitan areas. 42 She then employed a
statistical model which estimates the dollar penalty associated with
brown collar representation in an occupation. 43 She found that
brown collar occupations suffered substantial wage penalties, the pen-
alties were larger for minorities than for whites, and educational levels
of the workers in the study did not affect the outcome.
Dr. Catanzarite analyzed the data even further and found that
occupations in which recent Latino immigrants represented 25% or
more of the workplace population experienced an average wage pen-
alty of approximately $2400. 4 4 By contrast, occupations with a much
lower percentage of recent Latino immigrants (5% or less), where
there is a relative absence of brown collar workers, experienced an
average wage penalty of approximately $500. 4 5 Because minorities are
far more likely to be employed in brown collar occupations, they suf-
fer deeper and more frequent wage penalties than do whites. 46 In an
occupation with a 15% recent immigrant Latino population, earlier-
immigrant Latino men earn $4584 less than their counterparts in sim-
ilar non-brown collar occupations, African Americans earn $2280 less,
native Latinos earn $1523 less, and whites experience a $1034 wage
38 Catanzarite, Race-Gender Composition, supra note 35, at 29.
39 Id. at 14 n.2.
40 Catanzarite, Occupational Context, supra note 35 (describing her methodology
in her study of wages in brown collar occupations across thirty-eight markets).
41 Catanzarite, Wage Penalties, supra note 35, at 1-3.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 2.
44 Id. at 1.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 2.
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penalty.47 When brown collar workers occupy a field, all workers suf-
fer a wage penalty-though whites suffer a much smaller penalty than
do minorities. 48 Dr. Catanzarite found that the wage penalty exists
even after controlling for workers' qualifications and occupational
characteristics. 49 Additional schooling does little to improve either
pay or working conditions in brown collar occupations.50 There
seems to be no correlation in brown collar jobs between the extent of
a worker's education and the amount of his pay.51 If this is the case,
additional education does little to improve wages in brown collarjobs.
Dr. Cantanzarite concluded that something other than the social sta-
tus and human capital of brown collar workers steers the wage setting
process. There seem to be structural dynamics that produce the non-
competitive labor market.52
A gradual wage deterioration is linked with proportionately
higher percentages of Latinos in a particular workforce. In other
words, as recent immigrant Latinos increasingly concentrate in low-
skill, low-paying occupations, wage penalties emerge, and wages be-
come suppressed. 53 In social science, a devaluation theory model ex-
plains that occupational pay falls once a position becomes filled with
women or racial minorities.5 4 There seems to be a "tipping" point
beyond which the identification of ajob or occupation with a particu-
lar race, gender, or national origin signals a less-desirable job.55
Under this theory, biases emerge in the wage setting process. In other
words, "once a job is associated with a subordinate group, the job's
pay declines because it suffers from 'status contamination.' ''56 The
experience of brown collar workers indicates that some portion of
wage rate suppression may be attributable to discrimination. As Dr.
Catanzarite describes:
47 Catanzarite, Occupational Context, supra note 35, at 12.
48 Id. at 14 ("[N]ative-born men employed in brown-collar occupations suffer a
substantial wage discount relative to their counterparts in other fields without over-
representations of recent-immigrant Latinos.").
49 Catanzarite, Wage Penalties, supra note 35, at 2.
50 Id.; see also Catanzarite & Aguilera, supra note 35, at 119 (finding that attend-
ing school in the United States generates no wage benefit for the Latino survey
participants).
51 Catanzarite, Wage Penalties, supra note 35, at 2.
52 Catanzarite & Aguilera, supra note 35, at 122.
53 Catanzarite, supra note 3, at 330.
54 Julie A. Kmec, Minority Job Concentration and Wages, 50 Soc. PROBS. 38, 40
(2003).
55 See Catanzarite, Race-Gender Composition, supra note 35, at 17 (citing to several
studies showing a similar tipping phenomenon in female dominated fields).
56 Kmec, supra note 54, at 40.
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Beliefs in lesser competence or worthiness fuels discrimination. Sys-
tematic hiring discrimination restricting low-status workers to rela-
tively undesirable fields produces a constrained opportunity
structure and thus is implicated in their acquiescence. Similarly,
discriminatory beliefs in lesser competence or worthiness of low-sta-
tus groups may drive devaluation. Accordingly, work done by low-
status immigrants is likely to be culturally devalued, consonant with
[the] argument that immigrants' low social status can transfer to
their work itself.... Brown-collar fields are candidates for this type
of devaluation and downward wage pressure, and native incum-
bents' pay degradation is tied to newcomer Latinos' low status.
5 7
Another characteristic of brown collar occupations is that brown
collar workers are much more likely to be segregated from other eth-
nic groups in the workplace. Marielena's story is consistent with re-
search findings that show recent immigrant Latinos are more likely to
work in segregated workplaces in several brown collar occupations.
58
Moreover, an analysis of brown-collar occupations in eighteen immi-
grant-receiving, ethnically heterogeneous metropolitan areas shows
that whites are the population most likely to be segregated from
brown collar workers, followed by native blacks, native Latinos, and
earlier immigrant Latinos. 59 White males benefit because segregated
jobs tend to "crowd" white males into higher-paying positions.
60 This
segregation pattern is repeated in nonmetropolitan areas.
61 The
trend is especially troubling because it may signal the re-segregation
of the workplace throughout the South and Midwest.
Female brown collar workers tend to be even more isolated than
their male counterparts, and they suffer the effects of both gender
and national origin in the workplace. In the poultry industry, certain
brown collar jobs within the industry are also segregated by gender.
62
The line jobs at the Tyson plant in northwest Arkansas are occupied
by women even though most of the workforce is male.
63 The line jobs
are the worst in the plant because they require repetitive tasks with the
same sets of movements all day long.64 Women are excluded from
most other work in the plant.65 Although case law has addressed the
57 Catanzarite, supra note 3, at 306.
58 Catanzarite, Occupational Context, supra note 35, at 9.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Kandel & Parrado, supra note 7, at 3-5.
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interplay between race and gender in discrimination, 66 further re-
search is needed to document the intersectionality between gender
and national origin in brown collar work to determine whether and
how much brown collar female workers are affected by their status.
Such research in this arena would help determine how best to fashion
strategies to protect this subgroup of brown collar workers.
In sum, the research indicates that as brown collar workers enter
an occupation, wages begin to deteriorate, and they continue to de-
press as the percentage of brown collar workers increases. The longi-
tudinal data confirms that the wage penalty occurs over time, and
creates a more effective causal connection than studies that merely
compare workers' salaries contemporaneously. Dr. Catanzarite's stud-
ies comparing occupations with different percentages of brown collar
workers complete the picture: not only does the wage penalty accrue
over time, but the penalty remains for all workers as the percentages
of brown collar workers increase. The wage penalty also correlates
with the increasing segregation of brown collar workers from the rest
of the workplace population.
III. A PROFILE OF BROWN COLLAR WORKERS' STATUS
Before examining how existing legal paradigms may apply to this
growing brown collar dynamic, we must first identify some of the
outside factors that affect brown collar workers' status in the work-
place. Recall that brown collar workers are recently arrived Latino
immigrants working in occupations where Latinos are over-
represented or concentrated. Many, though not all, have questiona-
ble legal status. As they enter the workplace, segregation trends
increase, wages become depressed and conditions worsen. This con-
text in and of itself makes for a vulnerable workforce. Yet, there are
additional factors that work against this population to make it even
more susceptible to workplace exploitation and to the wage and segre-
gation dynamics described in this Article. First, the brown collar pool
tends to be drawn from rural areas and tends to be undereducated. 67
66 The intersectionality between national origin and gender may give rise to over-
lapping forms of discrimination, which are distinct from either gender or national
origin claims. See, e.g., Lam v. Univ. of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551, 1562 (9th Cir. 1994)
(holding that a claim based on race and gender could not be reduced to its distinct
components);Jefferies v. Harris County Cmty. Action Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1032 (5th
Cir. 1980) ("Discrimination against black females can exist even in the absence of
discrimination against black men or white women."); Anthony v. County of Sacra-
mento, 898 F. Supp. 1435, 1445 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that a derogatory term
aimed at a black woman could not be exclusively racist or sexist).
67 Lazos Vargas, supra note 12, at 351.
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Employers are drawing from a mobilized group of transnational work-
ers whose needs exceed the ability to leverage better wages and work-
ing conditions. They tend to be isolated from social service structures
and they have less job mobility than the rest of the population. They
understand little about U.S. legal culture and may be intimidated by
its formality. As a result they have less understanding of their rights in
the workplace. Their lack of job mobility, moreover, gives them less
incentive to protect themselves.
Second, brown collar workers have limited English skills.
68 This
barrier keeps them isolated. It also contributes to a perceived inability
to seek a more desirable job once they have secured an initial job, and
it makes them reluctant to vindicate their rights for fear of losing their
jobs.
Third, brown collar workers may fear immigration consequences
if they come forward with complaints. This holds true whether a
brown collar worker is documented or undocumented. The current
immigration law framework engenders fear in a population that does
not understand immigration law and its evolving standards. The fear
is not without some reason, as immigration authorities have targeted
brown collar industries like meatpacking for enforcement of immigra-
tion laws. 69 The Ninth Circuit noted in Rivera v. Nibco, Inc.
70 that all
immigrant workers may be chilled by issues such as employer ques-
tions about immigration status because all workers may feel intimi-
dated by having their immigration history examined publicly.71 In
that case, workers sought protection from an employer's questions
about immigration status during discovery in a Title VII action. As the
court stated: "Documented workers may fear that their immigration
status would be changed, or that their status would reveal the immi-
gration problems of their family or friends ...."72 Because a large
portion of brown collar workers may be undocumented, they fear ret-
ribution should they complain about workplace conditions. Not only
do they face workplace retaliation, but they risk deportation or crimi-
68 Id.
69 In 2001-2002, for example, the INS conducted a series of raids in the Midwest,
called Operation Vanguard, targeting all meat processing plants in a specified area in
Nebraska and Iowa. The INS reviewed over 40,000 employee records in an attempt to
identify undocumented workers. See David Bacon, INS Declares War on Labor, TIHiE NA-
TION, Oct. 25, 1999, available at http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=19991025
85=bacon.
70 364 F.3d 1057, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that questions about a plain-
tiffs immigration status constitute an undue burden on the plaintiff and the public
interest).
71 Id. at 1064-65.
72 Id. at 1065.
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nal prosecution should they be reported to immigration authorities. 73
This fear, in turn, hinders the ability of all brown collar workers to
make changes within their occupations.
Fourth, brown collar workers must confront a legal barrier that
most other workers may not face. Brown collar workers may be espe-
cially vulnerable and fearful of cooperation with employment law en-
forcement authorities after the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in
Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB.74 In that case, the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) awarded post-termination back pay to Jose
Castro, an undocumented worker who was fired after he became in-
volved in union organizing activities in the workplace. 75 The em-
ployer appealed the decision until it reached the U.S. Supreme Court.
The Court held that a backpay award to Castro for work not per-
formed was outside the scope of the NLRB's authority because exer-
cising its remedial authority in such a manner ran counter to federal
immigration policy.76 Thus, under Hoffman, undocumented workers
have fewer remedies than their counterparts who are authorized to
work. Employers and worker rights' advocates are engaged in a strug-
gle to define the reach of Hoffman that will take years to resolve. 77
The case continues to have a chilling effect on workplace complaints
because employers have tried to expand the reach of Hoffman to limit
the rights of immigrant workers in other arenas. 78
73 Id. at 1064.
74 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
75 Id. at 137.
76 Id. at 149.
77 Arguably Hoffman could be limited to remedies that the NLRB has the author-
ity to grant, and is limited to the enforcement of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA). A Ninth Circuit panel recently intimated as much in Rivera v. Nibco, stating
that Hoffman did not apply to Title VII actions because "Tide VII's enforcement re-
gime includes not only traditional remedies for employment law violations, such as
backpay, frontpay, and reinstatement, but also full compensatory and punitive dam-
ages." Rivera, 364 F.3d at 1067. The Rivera court's analysis of the Title VII issue dem-
onstrates the questions left unanswered after Hoffman that will continue to be
litigated.
78 See, e.g., Renteria v. Italia Foods, No. 02-C-495, 2003 WL 21995190 (N.D. Ill.
Aug. 21, 2003) (deciding a case where employer argued that Hoffman precludes any
protection under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) for undocumented workers);
Singh v. Jutla & C.D. & R's Oil, Inc., 214 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1060 (N.D. Cal. 2002)
(same); Zeng Liu v. Donna Karan Int'l, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(same); Cortez v. Medina's Landscaping, No. 00-C-6320, 2002 WL 31175471 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 30, 2002) (deciding a case where employer claimed that the plaintiff was barred
from recovery under the FLSA because of undocumented status); De La Rosa v. N.
Harvest Furniture, 210 F.R.D. 237, 238 (C.D. Ill. 2002) (deciding a case where em-
ployer argued that Hoffman applied in an FLSA action); Topo v. Dhir, 210 F.R.D. 76
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Because the Latino population will likely continue to increase
rapidly, brown collar occupations will likely grow more prevalent with-
out strategies to reverse the trend. These workers labor under harsh
conditions and although the law extends protections, few avail them-
selves of these protections. The danger is two-fold. First, all workers in
brown collar occupations run the risk of losing ground in terms of
employment and labor protections if brown collar workers fear the
consequences of making workplace complaints. This fear makes it dif-
ficult for those who work alongside them to vindicate their own rights
or to create change in the workplace. Thus, without the ability of
brown collar workers to assert their rights, wages and working condi-
tions will continue to deteriorate for all workers. Second, as brown
collar occupations become more prevalent, there is a risk that the pat-
tern will become entrenched. As the numbers of brown collar work-
ers in occupations grow, we will begin to see an increase in segregated
workplaces. This is the pattern we can see developing in poultry
plants, where more than 80% of the workplace is Latino in some
places.
I suggest that we can utilize existing frameworks to deal with the
fear of brown collar workers and to help reverse the trend toward seg-
regation in brown collar occupations. I will focus on two areas. The
first is the creative use of the administration of immigration law. The
second focuses on legal strategies under Title VII disparate treatment
theory that address the changing workforce dynamics in brown collar
occupations.
IV. LEGAL STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING WORKERS IN BROWN
COLI-AR OCCUPATIONS
In this section I offer several approaches for protecting workers
in brown collar occupations within existing legal frameworks. I start
with the premise that legal protection of the brown collar worker pop-
ulation inures to the benefit of all workers. I first suggest that federal
administrative agencies cooperate more fully to protect workers who
complain, especially in cases of more egregious workplace violations.
I suggest that agencies cooperate to issue U visas to workers who coop-
erate in investigations of unlawful employment practices.
I then suggest that brown collar plaintiffs utilize the type of data
that has been described in this Article to address the barriers that may
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (same); Flores v. Albertsons, Inc., No. CV0100515AHM(SHX), 2002
WL 1163623 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2002) (same).
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exist for brown collar workers in disparate treatment claims. 79 One
possible barrier may be that brown collar plaintiffs may not be able to
identify similarly situated employees to compare to, especially as
brown collar occupations reach the 100% Latino population rate. I
suggest that brown collar plaintiffs use longitudinal data as a substi-
tute for comparators. Another barrier may be that brown collar plain-
tiffs will have to respond to the employer's argument that brown
collarization is the result of market factors to which employers are
merely reacting. I suggest that plaintiffs utilize the data developed by
Dr. Catanzarite as evidence of a causal link between the employer's
recruiting practices, wage penalties or worsening conditions, and the
employer's intent. I also suggest that brown collar plaintiffs utilize
strategies developed by plaintiffs in Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO) complaints to show that employer's wage
setting practices are deliberate and not merely a response to market
forces. In concluding this section, I discuss the possible consequences
of the strategies I propose.
A. Increasing Cooperation Between Immigration and
Employment Authorities
Although it may seem counterintuitive, in order to ensure and
protect the rights of all workers in brown collar occupations, it may be
necessary to devise strategies for protecting undocumented workers
against immigration law enforcement. Because a large portion of
brown collar workers may be undocumented, their fear of com-
plaining about workplace conditions hinders the ability of all workers
in brown collar occupations to make changes. In the absence of legis-
lation offering legalization to undocumented workers in the United
States, employment and immigration law enforcement agencies must
work with one another to meet common goals of ensuring employer
compliance with labor and employment law as well as immigration
policy. Although not all brown collar workers are undocumented,
they suffer the same wage penalties and working conditions by virtue
of positions alongside undocumented workers.
In order to partially address the chilling effect of the Hoffman
decision, I suggest that agencies such as the Department of Labor
(DOL), the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
and the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)
79 I focus on some ideas for disparate treatment claims, although they are by no
means exhaustive of the ways in which brown collar workers should be protected by
existing laws. I am fully cognizant that the other theories in Title VII law as well as
other employment and labor laws should be further explored.
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within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) could cooperate
to protect workers who come forward with complaints about work-
place abuses. There is precedent for cooperation. In October 2003,
Wal-Mart became the target of a federal investigation involving
charges that the company used labor contractors to knowingly hire
undocumented workers for its cleaning crews in stores throughout the
country. The janitors agreed to cooperate in a criminal investigation
of Wal-Mart's practices.80 Labor investigators worked with USCIS to
defer the deportation of nine immigrant janitors who complained of
wage and hour violations.8' Although it is not clear whether visas
were issued to the janitors, this is the type of case where U visas should
be used to protect cooperating undocumented workers more fully.
The EEOC helping complainants obtain work authorization sta-
tus through existing immigration programs is the kind of cooperation
that would encourage employer compliance with existing laws. One
avenue of legalization within the current immigration system, the U
visa, can be used to provide brown collar workers with employment
authorization if they cooperate in criminal investigations by local or
federal authorities. U visas provide victims of certain crimes with legal
status, work authorization and the opportunity for permanent status.
These can be utilized in cases where the EEOC is investigating the
type of particularly egregious workplace violations that arguably exist
now in brown collar industries.8 2 In 2000, Congress passed the Vic-
tims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act (TVPA) and strength-
ened the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) to provide more
effective protections for immigrant victims of violence, in and out of
the workplace.8 3 Congress amended the Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA) to add a new category of nonimmigrant visas to protect
immigrant victims of several crimes from deportation and to help law
enforcement agencies in the detection, investigation and prosecution
of various crimes. The U visa provides legal nonimmigrant status to
victims or material witnesses of the following or similar crimes: rape,
torture, trafficking, incest, domestic violence, sexual assault, abusive
mutilation, being held hostage, peonage, involuntary servitude, slave
80 Brian Donohue, U.S. Lifts Departure Threat for 9Janitors-Illegal Immigrants Could
Testify in Wal-Mart Hiring Investigation, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.),July 4, 2004, at 19,
available at 2004 WL 56548744.
81 Id.
82 Juliet Stumpf & Bruce Friedman, Advancing Civil Rights Through Immigration
Law: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 131, 163-65
(2002).
83 Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114
Stat. 1464 (2000).
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trade, kidnapping, abduction, unlawful criminal restraint, false impris-
onment, blackmail, extortion, manslaughter, murder, felonious as-
sault, witness tampering, obstruction of justice, perjury, or attempt,
conspiracy or solicitation to commit any of the above mentioned
crimes.8 4 The visa is available to a victim of any of these offenses who
has been or is being helpful to a federal, state or local law enforce-
ment official, or to the United States Immigration and Customs En-
forcement (USICE)/USCIS in the investigation of the criminal activity
described above or a similar activity. 85 EEOC investigators may have
the ability to investigate criminal activity that is associated with work-
place discrimination in ways similar to those utilized by federal investi-
gators in the Wal-Mart situation. One of the requirements of visa
eligibility is that the law enforcement agency certify a worker's cooper-
ation.8 6 EEOC investigators should consider the practice of using
such certifications to protect brown collar workers who do come for-
ward with complaints. No doubt this practice will increase the de-
mand for U visas. Currently there are 10,000 U visas available per
year.8 7 Congress may need to revisit the U visa category to increase
the numbers of such visas available yearly if this is to become an effec-
tive vehicle for the protection of brown collar workers who cooperate
with federal or local authorities.
Removing immigrants' fear of making workplace complaints also
removes much of the employer's incentive to target immigrant popu-
lations for low wage and undesirable jobs. This is an important first
step in vindicating the rights of brown collar employees in the
workplace.
B. Bringing an Employment Discrimination Lawsuit in the Brown
Collar Context
Title VII has become the tool to eradicate discriminatory work-
place practices related to recruitment, hiring and assignment of work-
ers and it can be used here to vindicate brown collar workers' rights.
In Title VII cases it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against
an employee on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin. 8 Title VII cases cover issues such as hire, discharge, terms and
conditions of employment, limitation, segregation or classification of
employees. A Title VII plaintiff must demonstrate a causal connec-
84 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(iii) (2000).
85 Id. § 101 (a)(15) (U) (i) (III).
86 Id.
87 Id. § l184(p) (2) (A).
88 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
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tion, showing that an employer's action was because of race or na-
tional origin. In this section I offer two specific suggestions that may
make existing Title VII law more effective in the brown collar context.
Although there are several methods of proving causation in discrimi-
nation cases, I will concentrate here on the disparate treatment theory
of discrimination.
C. The Existing Disparate Treatment Framework
Under section 703(a) (1) of Title VII, an employer may not "fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such indi-
vidual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."89
In disparate treatment cases courts focus on whether the em-
ployer's actions were motivated by a discriminatory intent.90 The Su-
preme Court set out the standard for a plaintiffs prima facie case in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.91 The McDonnell Douglas scheme re-
quires a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case for discrimination by
proving that the plaintiff is a member of a protected class, that the
plaintiff was denied an employment opportunity for which he was
qualified and that the employer continued to seek employees with
plaintiffs qualifications for that employment opportunity.92 The
framework requires the plaintiff to show a similarly situated person
with whom he can compare his treatment. A disparate treatment the-
ory requires that the plaintiff show that the defendant's actions were
motivated by discriminatory intent through the three-part McDonnell
Douglas framework. The plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of
discrimination; the employer must respond with a legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason for its actions; and the plaintiff must establish that
the employer's articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason was a
pretext to mask unlawful discrimination. 93
An employee can also bring a disparate treatment pattern and
practice or class action claim alleging discrimination against a pro-
tected group.94 Here the plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing
89 Id.
90 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986 (1988) (holding that
disparate treatment analysis requires proof of discriminatory intent).
91 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The Supreme Court reaffirmed the standard in Texas
Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) and St. Mary's Honor Center v.
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
92 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
93 Id. at 806.
94 See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
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that a pattern and practice of differential treatment is the employer's
standard operating procedure.95 The plaintiff can use statistical evi-
dence along with anecdotal evidence to create an inference of dis-
crimination.96 Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of
discrimination, the employer can rebut the evidence with its own sta-
tistical evidence or by undermining the plaintiffs statistical evidence.
If the employer is not successful in rebutting the plaintiffs prima facie
case, the court can infer discrimination and the case moves to a reme-
dial stage where the court determines the damages to be awarded to
each individual.
9 7
D. Disparate Treatment Theory in the Brown Collar Context
The studies discussed in the first part of this Article demonstrate
that as occupations become more brown, wages and working condi-
tions worsen, and workers become increasingly segregated. This phe-
nomenon promises to become even more prevalent unless we can use
existing law to reverse the trend.
In the brown collar context, the plaintiff can claim that the em-
ployer intentionally targeted her for recruitment because of her na-
tional origin, expecting that she would take a lower-paying job. The
plaintiff will claim that the employer either channeled her into the
undesirable position or decreased her wages as the position began to
tip toward brown collar status. The plaintiff will also claim in a pat-
tern and practice case that the employer's practice was to target
brown collar workers for the undesirable jobs in the workplace.
Two potential problems that may arise in brown collar disparate
treatment cases can be addressed by the strategies I suggest in this
Article. The first is the problem of a lack of comparator, especially in
brown collar occupations where the numbers of Latinos continue to
rise. Traditional disparate treatment theory requires the plaintiff to
show similarly situated employees who are treated differently, usually
better than, the plaintiff. The theory is less applicable where a job,
company site or occupation is completely Latino and the plaintiff can-
not identify the opportunities from which he/she is precluded. The
case of the chicken processing plant in Hall County, Georgia, shows
95 Id. at 325.
96 Id. at 339; see also Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 401-02 (1986) (accepting
plaintiff's statistical evidence of hiring disparities along racial lines); Hazelwood Sch.
Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307 (1977) (holding that gross statistical dispari-
ties can be used to show a prima facie case of a pattern and practice of
discrimination).
97 Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 361-62.
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the difficulty of proving that similarly situated workers are treated dif-
ferently: more than 80% of the plant is comprised of Latino workers.
It is clear that some job lines will be exclusively Latino. What hap-
pens, then, if the entire plant, or a vast majority, is Latino, as is the
case with poultry plants throughout the Southeast? Without proof
that brown collar workers are treated differently than similarly situ-
ated employees outside their protected class, a plaintiff may have
trouble meeting her prima facie burden.98
The second problem involves rebutting the employer's argument
that it is merely responding to market forces. Under the traditional
framework, once a brown collar plaintiff proves her prima facie case,
an employer can posit a nondiscriminatory reason for wage depres-
sion and/or segregation which is related to a legitimate business pur-
pose. Here the employer may assert that paying the market rate for a
job is legitimate reason enough to recruit and hire Latino immigrants
because they happen to be the only ones who will take the jobs that
the employer has to offer. Employers, the argument goes, are simply
reacting to market forces that set wages and conditions at a level that
no other U.S. worker will accept. This "market" defense was used in a
previous generation of cases targeting gender and race pay inequity.99
The market defense asserts, in part, that employees choose to take the
jobs that employers offer at a given rate, an argument that has been
challenged in social science and legal literature.100 The defense has
98 See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; see also O'Donnell v. Associated Gen.
Contractors of Am., Inc., 645 A.2d 1084, 1087 (D.C. 1994) (noting that part of the
McDonnell Douglas requirement includes a showing that similarly situated employees
are treated more favorably).
99 See, e.g., EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1986),
affd, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988); American Nurses Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716
(7th Cir. 1986); AFSCME v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985); Lewis v. To-
bacco Workers Int'l Union, 577 F.2d 1135 (4th Cir. 1978); ROBERT L. NELSON & WIL-
LIAM P. BRIDGES, LEGALIZING GENDER INEQUALITY- COURTS, MARKETS, AND UNEQUAL
PAY FOR WOMEN IN AMERICA 357-58 (Mark Granovetter ed., 1999).
100 See generally NELSON AND BRIDGES, supra note 99 (describing the market defense
in various cases and contexts); Martha Chamallas, Women and Part-Time Work: The Case
for Pay Equity and Equal Access, 64 N.C. L. REv. 709, 711 (1986) (contending that part-
time work is regarded as inferior by employers and society, and that laws prohibiting
sex discrimination in employment have provided little protection for part-time work-
ers); Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex
Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103
HARv. L. REv. 1749 (1990) (providing a good overview of sociological research show-
ing that women do not "choose" to remain in low-payingjobs, but actually develop job
preferences based on structural and cultural features of employing organizations, and
arguing that employers play a larger role than is recognized in shaping employees'
expectations of work); Vicki Schultz & Stephen Petterson, Race, Gender, Work and
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had mixed results, depending on the evidence the plaintiff provides
to show that the employer's reason is a pretext for discrimination. In
those cases where men and women are clearly treated differently with
respect to the same job, courts tend to disregard the market defense.
So, for example, in City of Los Angeles Department of Power & Water v.
Manhart, the Supreme Court held that Title VII prohibited companies
from charging women more for retirement insurance than men even
though the company showed that the differences were based on actua-
rial charts used throughout the market. 01 In those cases where the
basis for a pay differential may be less than clear, the courts tend to
accept the employer's market argument.10 2 For example, in AFSCME
v. Washington, a comparable worth case, female plaintiffs sued the
state of Washington for gender-based discrimination in its wage-set-
ting practices. 0 3 The Seventh Circuit court held that the plaintiffs
failed to establish a link between the cause of the disparity and intent
on the part of the employer:
The requirement of intent is linked at least in part to culpability.
That concept would be undermined if we were to hold that pay-
ment of wages according to prevailing rates in the public and pri-
vate sector is an act that, in itself, supports the inference of a
purpose to discriminate. Neither law nor logic deems the free mar-
ket system a suspect enterprise.
10 4
Likewise, outside the comparable worth context, in May v. Shuttle,
the court affirmed summary judgment in favor of an employer that
argued its decision to terminate the plaintiff and outsource her de-
partment was based on economic factors and was, therefore, a legiti-
mate business reason.
105
E. Strategies to Address Issues that May Face Brown Collar Workers in
Disparate Treatment Lawsuits
1. Using Longitudinal Data as Comparator Evidence
A disparate treatment plaintiff should be able to utilize the longi-
tudinal data such as that developed by Dr. Catanzarite regarding jobs
that were previously held by non-Latinos-and now held by brown
Choice: An Empirical Study of the Lack of Interest Defense in Title VII Cases Challenging Job
Segregation, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 1073 (1992) (analyzing the relative success of the lack of
interest defense in Title VII cases based on gender and race claims).
101 435 U.S. 702, 709 (1975).
102 NELSON & BRIDGES, supra note 99, at 358.
103 770 F.2d 1401, 1403 (9th Cir. 1985).
104 Id. at 1407 (citations omitted).
105 May v. Shuttle, 129 F.3d 165, 180 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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collar workers-to satisfy the first prong of the McDonnell Douglas
prima facie case. Using this data, a plaintiff can establish the compa-
rator as the predecessor group of employees, and the comparator's
pay would be based on past wages in the industry. Such proof of a
causal link between workforce tipping and wage degradation can cre-
ate an inference of discrimination.
This strategy ultimately requires that plaintiffs posit and courts
accept longitudinal data as a substitute for similarly situated employ-
ees where there are none. Longitudinal data should demonstrate that
industry practices change with the introduction of new workplace
populations and that the changes in working conditions correlate with
workplace composition. Further longitudinal research may be neces-
sary to show that the jobs or occupations remain essentially un-
changed despite any restructuring the industry may have undergone.
In the case of deskilled industries, further research may be needed to
show either that wage penalties remain even after controlling for
changes in job characteristics, or to show that wage penalties are one
aspect of an overall job devaluation that occurs once an occupation
tips from one ethnic group to another. Either of these scenarios
could still be considered discrimination if the longitudinal data exhib-
ited trends that pointed to employer bias. 106 Disparate treatment
based on longitudinal data should be actionable even though the
plaintiff successfully obtained a job with the employer. The plaintiff
in that case should be able to argue that even treatment considered
favorable (here, a position with the employer) can constitute actiona-
ble disparate treatment.
10 7
2. Using Data to Rebut the Market Defense
Here, I suggest developing models that more closely link an em-
ployer's ability to set wages in a market with an employer's intent to
differentiate between brown collar workers and predecessor employ-
ees. There is a good deal of literature regarding how much an em-
ployer can rely on the market as part of a business necessity
106 See, for example, DONALD TOMASKOViC-DEVEY, GENDER AND RACIAL INEQUALITY
AT WORK: THE SOURCE AND CONSEQUENCES OF JOB SEGREGATION 12-132 (1993), for a
description of how the composition of a job influences its pay, level of complexity,
and autonomy among other factors.
107 See, e.g., Ferrill v. Parker Group, Inc., 168 F.3d 468, 472 (11th Cir. 1999) (re-
quiring African American telemarketers to canvass an African American neighbor-
hood violated § 1981); Bermudez v. TRC Holdings, Inc., 138 F.3d 1176, 1177-78 (7th
Cir. 1998) (allowing the plaintiff to prove disparate treatment in case where he was
assigned to new position servicing minority travelers).
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defense. 10 8 A review of the market defense and pro-market ideology
in employment law opinions is beyond the scope of this Article.
Nonetheless, I want to suggest some strategies for beginning to chal-
lenge the argument that an employer is simply responding to market
forces in setting its wage scale, and so develop an alternative view of
the relationship between employers, markets, and wages. Part of the
goal in determining the role of employer decisionmaking in wage set-
ting is to identify that portion of wages arising from employer bias in
order to show a linkage between the cause of the wage disparity and
employer intent or motive.10 9 Control of market forces and recruiting
practices signals that an employer may be targeting brown collar work-
ers because of their perceived willingness to accept low pay and worse
working conditions. Information from the type of data that Dr. Cat-
anzarite provides, as well as from other sources, can be gleaned to
support an argument that employers in brown collar industries con-
trol enough factors in the labor market to set at least a portion of
wages, especially for a noncompetitive market. For example, evidence
in longitudinal studies of wage depression indicates that a wage pen-
alty exists even after controlling for educational levels of brown collar
workers, suggesting that something other than an individual's human
capital is at stake in wage setting. Evidence uncovered during the Ty-
son criminal investigation about employer recruiting and hiring prac-
tices also reveals much-needed insight about the bargaining power of
employers as well as their intent, especially when it comes to hiring
and assigning brown collar workers to their occupations. 10 Each of
these pieces of evidence may be used as indicators of an employer's
108 See supra notes 99-100. See generally NELSON & BRIDGES, supra note 99, at
371-84, for a good overview of publications discussing the relationship between em-
ployers, markets, and wages; Cynthia D. Anderson & Donald Tomaskovic-Devey, Patri-
archal Pressures: An Exploration of Organizational Processes that Exacerbate and Erode Gender
Earnings Inequality, 22 WORK AND OCCUPATIONS 328-56 (1995); William P. Bridges &
Robert L. Nelson, Markets in Hierarchies: Organizational and Market Influences on Gender
Inequality in a State Pay System, 95 AM.J. Soc. 616-58 (1989); Schultz, supra note 100;
Schultz & Petterson, supra note 100.
109 Proof of intent requires more than awareness of the consequences; the plain-
tiff must show that the employer's actions were "because of, not merely in spite of its
adverse effect upon an identifiable group." Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442
U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (internal quotations omitted). In other words, the plaintiff must
show that membership in a protected class is a motivating factor in the adverse em-
ployment decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000); see also Desert Palace, Inc. v.
Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003) (holding that to prevail under § 2000e-2(m), a plaintiff
need only demonstrate, through either direct or circumstantial evidence, that an em-
ployer used a forbidden consideration with respect to any employment practice).
110 See Tyson Indictment, supra note 31.
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intent. If the gender pay inequity cases are any indication, the clearer
the connection between the employer's action, the employer's ability
to affect the market, and the employer's motive, the more successful a
brown collar plaintiffs ability to rebut the employer's business neces-
sity defense. Otherwise, brown collar workers face the danger that
courts will refuse to deconstruct an employer's assertions regarding
the effect of market forces on wage setting.
Here, we can take lessons from plaintiffs in a similar set of cases
who have proposed utilizing social science and economic data to show
that employers in brown collar industries actually control much more
of the wage setting than they profess. Although the causes of action in
those cases are based on violations of RICO, I will discuss these cases
briefly to provide a flavor of the type of data that plaintiffs can bring
into Title VII cases. The plaintiffs in those cases sued employers be-
cause they suffered depressed wages caused by the employers' practice
of hiring undocumented workers in violation of INA § 274 and 8
U.S.C. § 1324, and paying them below-market wages.111 The plaintiffs
sued under RICO, which requires them to show that the employers'
illegal schemes to hire undocumented workers caused the plaintiffs to
suffer wage penalties. In order to show causation, the plaintiffs in
these cases must prove that employers have the power to affect the
labor market in a particular geographic area, either because they have
the ability to define wages by virtue of their market share, or because
they are involved in a scheme to build a noncompetitive labor mar-
ket. 112 I suggest that brown collar plaintiffs heed such data and im-
port it into the existing Title VII framework as proof to rebut the
employer's business necessity argument that it is merely responding to
the market in wage setting.
In Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit, for example, the plaintiffs, a group of
legally authorized workers, alleged that their employers "comprise a
large percentage of the fruit orchards and packing houses in the area,
and therefore affect wages throughout the labor market."113 They
111 See, e.g., Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 370 F.3d 602 (6th Cir. 2004); Baker v.
IBP, 357 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2004); Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 314 F. Supp. 2d
1333 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (presenting a case where plaintiffs sued the second largest car-
pet and rug manufacturer in the United States for depressing wages by hiring un-
documented workers). In 1996, Congress amended the RICO statute to include as
racketeering activity any act indictable under INA § 274, if committed for the purpose
of financial gain. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-132, Sec. 433, § 4, 110 Stat. 1214, 1274 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961 (1) (F) (2000)). Knowingly hiring a group of undocumented workers is in-
cluded in this category. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(1) (B) (2000).
112 See Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co., 301 F.3d 1163, 1171 (9th Cir. 2002).
113 Id. at 1167.
2004]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
also alleged that the "[d] efendants have exploited these workers' pre-
carious economic situation and fear of asserting their rights to drive
the wage rate for both documented and undocumented workers lower
than it would be if defendants did not hire undocumented work-
ers."114 The circuit court reversed the district court's dismissal of the
case and allowed the plaintiffs to move forward with their pleadings,
noting that "the workers must be allowed to make their case through
presentation of evidence, including experts who will testify about the
labor market, the geographic market, and the effects of the illegal
scheme [of hiring undocumented workers] .- 115
Trollinger v. Tyson Foods provides a similar example in the poultry
context.1 6 After the U.S. government indicted Tyson managers in
Shelbyville, Tennessee, for conspiring to smuggle and then hire un-
documented workers in violation of INA § 274, several plaintiffs in
the Shelbyville plant sued Tyson under RICO for depressing wages by
knowingly hiring workers who were paid wages well below those paid
in labor markets composed of legally authorized workers. According
to the plaintiffs, Tyson's manipulation of the labor market allowed the
company to pay wages substantially below the wage level paid to low-
skill workers in the areas surrounding the Tyson facilities in Shelby-
ville." 7 The appellate court recently reversed the district court's dis-
missal of the case, allowing the plaintiffs to bring forward evidence of
both Tyson's ability to influence the labor market in the area, and
Tyson's ability to depress wages in the area." 8 This and the other
RICO cases indicate that the possibility does exist for showing the em-
ployer's role in the setting of wages for brown collar workers. I sug-
gest that brown collar plaintiffs take note of and import this kind of
data into the existing Title VII framework as proof to rebut the em-
114 Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co., No. CS-00-3024-FVS, 2000 WL 33225470, at *2
(E.D. Wash. Sept. 27, 2000).
115 Mendoza, 301 F.3d at 1171. The district court's reluctance to delve into market
factors was evident:
[T] he wage rate that plaintiffs might have been paid would depend on the
wage rate paid by other orchardists and similar employers, the general avail-
ability of laborers, documented and undocumented, in the Yakima Valley,
the profitability of the defendants' businesses, the qualifications of each
plaintiff, whether the plaintiffs individually or as a class would have been
hired at a higher rate, and other factors. Sifting through those factors to
determine the exact amount of loss attributable to the defendants' alleged
violations would be a daunting task at best.
Mendoza, 2000 WL 33225470, at *10.
116 370 F.3d 602 (6th Cir. 2004).
117 Id. at 606.
118 Id. at 622.
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ployer's business necessity argument that it is merely following the
market in wage setting.
Why not just use a RICO theory to protect the rights of brown
collar workers? Although the strategy is innovative and should be suc-
cessful, the set of RICO cases described above are based on a tactic of
dividing the brown collar population into those who deserve remedies
and those who do not. Although the theory should not be dis-
counted, it is not clear whether the interests of all brown collar work-
ers, documented and undocumented, can be represented in the same
RICO action. In fact, the Ninth Circuit in Mendoza noted in its analy-
sis of whether the plaintiffs suffered a direct harm from the em-
ployer's practice that the undocumented workers in these cases
"cannot be counted on to bring suit for the law's vindication."' 19 A
cause of action based on Title VII, on the other hand, is more likely to
protect all workers in a brown collar occupation, rather than simply
the documented workers, because Title VII has been held to protect
all employees, regardless of immigration status.1 20 In the case of
brown collar occupations, all workers are affected by the employer's
wage setting practices. Protecting one set of workers over another
does little to ensure employer compliance over the long run; it merely
pushes undocumented workers further underground in the labor
market.
The data in the first part of this Article provides circumstantial
evidence that employers have pulled recent Latino immigrants into
the workforce through their recruiting methods. The data also sug-
gest that the employer pull has created a segregated brown collar
workforce in several industries. Finally, the data shows that as brown
collar occupations become increasingly more Latino, the wage penalty
over time is correspondingly high, and that factors specific to individ-
ual workers, such as education, have no effect on the wage penalty. I
suggest that more than simply providing the context for Marielena's
story, these pieces of evidence can be linked together to help brown
119 Mendoza, 301 F.3d at 1170 (citations omitted).
120 See, e.g., EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1517 (9th Cir. 1989); EEOC
v. Switching Sys. Div. of Rockwell Int'l Corp., 783 F. Supp. 369, 374 (N.D. Ill. 1992);
EEOC v. Tortilleria "La Mejor," 758 F. Supp. 585, 593-94 (E.D. Cal. 1991) ("Congress
did not intend [for IRCA to] amend or repeal any of the previously legislated protec-
tions of the federal labor and employment laws accorded to aliens, documented or
undocumented, including the protections of Tide VII."); Murillo v. Rite Stuff Foods,
Inc., 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 12, 21 (Cal. 1998) (finding that the employment discrimination
statutes apply to undocumented alien employees notwithstanding the illegality of em-
ploying them). But see Egbuna v. Time-Life Libraries, Inc., 153 F.3d 184, 187-88 (4th
Cir. 1998) (finding that undocumented applicants have no cause of action under
Title VII because they are unqualified to work under IRCA).
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collar plaintiffs develop a more clear correlation between the em-
ployer's action and the employer's intent in an individual or a pattern
and practice case.
In a pattern and practice disparate treatment claim, longitudinal
data can provide evidence that the disparate treatment is part of an
employer's normal operating procedure. In such a case, the plaintiff
will be able to show through statistics that a particular occupation has
become increasingly populated by one ethnic group over time. Here,
the brown collar plaintiff can use the statistical data to track the
changes in occupation over time and to show that the employer's
practices (such as decreasing wages over time as the population
changed) led to an undesirable overrepresentation of Latinos in ajob.
The plaintiff can use the data along with anecdotal evidence such as
Marielena's story to build an inference of disparate treatment.121
This suggested use of the data requires that courts move toward a
stricter standard that holds employers accountable to wage and work-
ing condition differentials which cannot be explained by market
forces. Moreover, courts must accept the notion that differentials can
be explained with longitudinal data. Nonetheless, the data describing
brown collar workers deserves attention. No doubt, still more re-
search is needed on the methods and practices employers utilize to set
wages and working conditions once an occupation starts to move to-
ward brown collarization. This is especially true for data regarding
the relationship between pay, gender, and ethnic origin in brown col-
lar occupations.
F Consequences of Implementing Suggested Strategies in Brown
Collar Lawsuits
Some would argue that the strategies I suggest in this Article
would eliminate brown collar jobs, to the detriment of the very work-
ers the reforms aim to protect. If these proposals were successfully
implemented, they would likely result in employers paying more for
brown collar labor as well as incurring costs to improve workplace
conditions. This may well result in fewerjobs available in brown collar
occupations in the United States, as employers attempt to cut costs in
other ways. I suggest that in brown collar fields, where occupational
hazards are relatively high and particularly debilitating, a worker
would opt for better working conditions, even if it meant fewer jobs.
Brown collar workers are, no doubt, also willing to compete for those
jobs on the same level as their non-Latino counterparts.
121 See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 325, 339 (1977).
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What about the cost of the suggested reforms to society and the
consumer? Communities that host large influxes of immigrants are
more susceptible to increased public costs in safety, education, hous-
ing, social services, and medical care. 122 The communities that are
integrating the brown collar population into their fabric would likely
benefit from the higher wages and improved working conditions that
these proposals would bring, as such improvements would soften the
usual social service and integration costs these communities may in-
cur.1 2 3 It is less clear how consumers would fare, as we need more
empirical work to determine how much of these increased labor costs
an employer might pass on to consumers. As we can see from the
costs that communities incur in brown collar regions, however, con-
sumers already pay for cheap products in terms of social costs. Empir-
ical data may well show that direct and indirect costs tend to cancel
each other out.
CONCLUSION
In this Article I have provided a general overview of the types of
problems that brown collar workers will continue to face to an even
greater degree in the future as the Latino population grows in the
workplace. I have introduced some issues that face brown collar work-
ers both in and outside the workplace that affect their status at work. I
have suggested methods for administering immigration law and for
applying existing disparate treatment frameworks in a brown collar
context. Developing and utilizing longitudinal data on the effects of
brown collarization on pay over time can provide the basis for compa-
rator evidence as an occupation grows increasingly Latino. Develop-
ing and utilizing economic models to show employer control over the
labor market gives brown collar plaintiffs some of the evidence they
need to show disparate treatment.
Several areas remain to be explored in future writings on this
topic. For example, brown collarization is similar in its characteristics
to pink collar work and yet provides another opportunity to reevaluate
the effectiveness of employment and labor law in protecting workers
from conditions of subordination. More research and study is needed
122 See STULL & BROADWAY, supra note 7, at 151 ("[P]ackinghouses bring signifi-
cant social and economic costs to host communities: declining per capita income,
housing shortages, increases in population mobility, and rising demands for health
care, public safety, education and indigent care.").
123 Although it is not entirely clear whether the existence of brown collar workers
overextends social service capacity, brown collar jobs tend to turn over quickly, and
this characteristic creates problems in housing, education, and the stability of a com-
munity. See Gouveia & Stull, supra note 2, at 15.
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to develop an appropriate and adequate alternative enforcement par-
adigm, for both male and female brown collar workers. There is a
real need to study the effect of brown collar workers on evolving em-
ployment and labor law, especially with respect to other theories of
proof in Title VII (including disparate impact and hostile work envi-
ronment cases), FLSA, NLRA, and state laws such as workers' compen-
sation statutes. As the brown collar population grows, we will need to
examine whether current doctrinal frameworks adequately protect
brown collar workers and whether changes are required in any of
these laws to better protect them. This is especially pressing if we are
to reverse the growing trend toward re-segregation in these low-wage
industries. Although the empirical data that currently exists supports
theories that plaintiffs can test in the current framework, more longi-
tudinal and economic data would be useful in developing theories
and models for improving existing law. The Latino population will
continue to expand in the American workplace, and as it does, brown
collar occupations promise to become more commonplace. It bene-
fits all workers if we begin to examine more deeply whether our laws
fit this emerging workplace paradigm. It remains important both for
all workers and for the continued viability of our employment and
labor laws that this most vulnerable population enjoy all the protec-
tions that our laws promise.
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